Use Conrail as auto industry guide
BY JAMES A. DUNN and ANTHONY PERL • February 16, 2009
DETROIT FREE PRESS
America's experience with Conrail offers valuable lessons to the Obama administration as it seeks to save Detroit's automakers. Conrail represents government's greatest success in rescuing a failing industry, restoring it and then returning it to profitability and private ownership.
During the 1970s, America's railroads were heading in the same direction General Motors, Chrysler and Ford are today. In its heyday, the Pennsylvania Railroad had been the equivalent of GM and was once known as "the standard railroad of the world."
But after merging with the New York Central, the new Penn Central collapsed into what was then America's largest corporate bankruptcy. Its failure threatened not just thousands of railroad jobs, but also jobs in many other industries that relied on rail transportation. The railroad sector was simply carrying too much baggage -- a century of accumulated outdated regulations, inefficient work rules and unprofitable business practices. It became clear to the Republican presidents of the time (Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford) and the Democratic-controlled Congress that a new business model and regulatory framework were needed.
In 1973, Congress passed legislation creating two new railroad entities. The first, the United States Railway Association (USRA), was an independent federal agency charged with reorganizing the bankrupt Northeast and Midwest railroads, including valuing and transferring their assets. The second, the Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail), a public corporation, would take over the assets and personnel of the bankrupt properties. Following the USRA's lead, Conrail was to implement a workable new business plan for American railroading. In 1976, Congress completed its work, passing sweeping legislation that realigned rail industry regulations with contemporary economic reality.
Conrail thrived by focusing on what the rail mode could do best: moving long freight trains over longer distances. Unprofitable passenger trains were offloaded to local agencies offering commuter transit and to Amtrak on long-distance routes, or abandoned. Local freight delivery was ceded to short-line railroads and truckers, pruning thousands of miles of branch line tracks from Conrail's network. And labor productivity was improved by buying out workers with up to seven years of severance pay.
Conrail attained profitability in 1981 and was privatized in an initial public offering of $1.9 billion in 1986. In 1999, Conrail was acquired and divided by two private freight railroads, the CSX Corp. and Norfolk Southern. Today CSX and Norfolk Southern have a combined market capitalization of more than $25 billion. By contrast, GM and Chrysler shares are worth under $7 billion. That's bottom-line proof of what the right kind of government revitalization efforts can achieve.
What lessons does Conrail hold for today's automotive crisis? First, as Presidents Ford and Nixon recognized, some problems are too big to be addressed only by a special adviser. Appointing a "car czar" will not be enough to carry through the transformation needed. Such far-reaching change calls for an institution with a serious budget, a substantial staff and, most important, the power to be the auto industry's banker, broker and perhaps even its bankruptcy trustee -- in other words, an automotive USRA.
Without a strong institutional actor, there is a danger that Washington's stakeholder-driven response will simply aim at protecting jobs and the automakers' obsolete business model. Left on their own, the companies, unions and hard-hit communities will see the road back to profitability paved with a surge of SUV sales and a plan to transfer their workers' health care and pension costs onto the government.
The current crisis is an opportunity to transform America's automotive industry from a moribund 1950s- style behemoth into a 21st-Century world leader, advancing climate policy, energy security, urban revitalization and safer personal mobility.
JAMES A. DUNN is a political science and public policy professor at Rutgers University, in New Jersey. He is the author of "Driving Forces: The Automobile, Its Enemies and the Politics of Mobility." ANTHONY PERL is a political science and urban studies professor at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada. He wrote "New Departures: Rethinking Rail Passenger Policy for the Twenty-First Century." Write to them in care of the Free Press Editorial Page, 615 W. Lafayette, Detroit, MI 48226 or at oped@freepress.com.
